Lack of Responsibility: Reasons-Responsiveness Theory and the Situationist Challenge

論文發表人: 黃大倫(加州大學河濱分校哲學系系博士班)

 

http://www.ircs.upenn.edu/spp/

 

社會心理學的研究結果可以質疑道德責任的歸屬在社會中的實踐。Situationism的研究指出：人類行為似乎被不相關環境因素所影響的程度遠高於我們的想像。如果Situationism的結論為真，道德責任的歸屬會面臨很大的問題。如果我的行為是被不相關的環境因素所導致的，那我還需要為我的行為負責嗎？在這篇論文裡，我主張這樣的結論是源於對Situationism錯誤的詮釋。如果我們能夠了解它真正的後果，則我們會理解為什麼Situationism和道德責任的歸屬是相容的。

 

The situationist literature has challenged our traditional conception of character traits and their roles in prediction and explaining behavior.   This challenge is significant and disturbing; yet, it is not the only challenge situationists bring to bear.  As Nelkin rightly argues in her recent article, the situationist literature seems to call into question our everyday assumption that we are, at least most of the time, free and responsible moral agents.  She questions why the situationist literature appears to threaten freedom and responsibility.  After analyzing possible routes to the threat, she concludes that one ultimate reason for the apparent threat is situationist experiments "challenge the idea that we can control our actions on the basis of good reasons".  I wish to continue this inquiry by considering how the situationist literature puts this cherished idea into doubt. 

In this paper, I shall focus on one particular version of the reason views, the reasons-responsiveness theory developed by Fischer and Ravizza.  I first briefly introduce this theory.  Then, I review some key situationist experiments and explain their significance.  Finally, I lay out four possible situationist challenges: (1) the capricious receptivity condition, (2) the fickle reactivity condition, (3) the misperception condition, and (4) the non-true value condition.  Also, I will discuss four strategies reasons-responsiveness theorists may develop in answering these challenges: (1) questioning its prevalence, (2) questioning its relevance, (3) adapting the theory to accommodate it, and (4) making one responsible for it.  In conclusion, it is still an open question whether the situationist literature challenges our moral responsibility practice.  The answer relies both on further empirical research and theoretical refinement.